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I. Introduction 
Globalization of employment is making knowledge of labor and 
employment law of all nations an imperative.  At the same time, 
comparative legal studies can help nations learn from one another and 
improve on existing legal systems.  As the United States Supreme Court 
is hurtling U.S. employment law into private dispute resolution and the 
Italian labor law system is under substantial pressure for reform as a 
result of economic stresses, a comparative study of workplace arbitration 
in the two countries is timely. 
This article looks at the law and impact of workplace arbitration in 
the United States and Italy with a goal of analyzing the influences that 
led to the current systems and determining whether the countries can 
derive any useful lessons from one another.  First, the article looks briefly 
at the labor and employment law systems in the two countries.  This 
analysis lays the backdrop for a discussion of the evolution and use of 
arbitration in the two countries.   The article then moves to an analysis of 
the similarities and differences between arbitration in Italy and the U.S. 
and the reasons for those differences.  Finally the article focuses on 
lessons that can be drawn from the two systems. 
The employment arbitration system in the U.S. is currently 
weighted in favor of employers, and could learn from the Italian 
protection of workers. The article suggests several modifications that 
would provide better balance in the current system.  But the article 
concludes that the historical and cultural forces that have shaped 
arbitration in the two countries make it unlikely that either will change 
significantly in the near future.   
II. Law and contract in the U.S. and Italy 
The legal systems governing the workplace in the United States 
and Italy vary dramatically.  These differences contribute to the 
differential approach to arbitration in the two countries.  This section will 
briefly explore the legal systems in order to assist in understanding the 
source of the differences in the use of arbitration. 
In the United States, statutes set minimum terms and conditions 
of employment which can be expanded by labor unions negotiating with 
employers, by individual employees negotiating with employers, typically 
highly skilled, highly paid employees, or by employers acting unilaterally.   
Statutes set a relatively low minimum wage, require overtime pay at a 
higher rate for more than 40 hours work per week, prohibit child labor, 
prescribe standards for a safe and healthful workplace, require unpaid 
leave for illness, childbirth and adoption and to care for an ill family 
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member, and set certain standards for pensions and health insurance 
voluntarily provided by employers.1   
The law provides benefits through mandatory insurance for 
workers who are unemployed or injured on the job, and requires 
contributions from the employer and employee into a national retirement 
system. In addition, the law prohibits discrimination based on race, 
religion, national origin, gender, age, citizenship, genetic makeup and 
disability. The law also determines who is an employee and who is an 
independent contractor not protected by employment laws. Most 
employees are at will, meaning that they can be fired at any time for any 
reason. Employees can negotiate contracts of employment that limit the 
employer’s authority to terminate them, but few have the power to do so 
unless represented by a union. 
For most employees in the United States, the employment laws 
and terms set by their employer govern their work, since  7.5% of 
employees in the private (nongovernmental) sector and 38.7% of 
employees in the public (governmental) sector have union 
representation.2  The laws are normally enforced by filing a lawsuit in 
court using an attorney hired by the employee or by filing a claim with a 
government agency having a duty to enforce the laws.  Section II will 
explain how and when arbitration can substitute for judicial enforcement.    
Union-represented employees are governed by a negotiated 
collective bargaining agreement, an enforceable contract including terms 
and conditions of employment in addition to the minimums required by 
law. This contract applies only to the employees represented by the 
union, however, so most employees are unaffected by these agreements.  
A contract will typically provide wage rates far in excess of the minimum 
wage, overtime premium pay in addition to what is required by law, and 
pay for holidays, vacations, funeral leave, and sick leave.  It may provide 
for certain benefits to be allocated by seniority, i.e., the length of time 
employed by the employer.  Such benefits might include layoff and recall 
in times of reduced workload, promotions, and work assignments.  A 
union contract will almost always require just cause for discipline and 
                                                     
1 As of 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires employers with 50 or 
more employees to provide health insurance for employees who work at least 30 hours per 
week.  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A); 26 
U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A). 
2 Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.  For some explanations of the decline in 
union representation and, accordingly, power, see JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF 
UNIONS 16–22 (2010); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The 
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining 
System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579-84(1992). 
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discharge, protection not normally available by law except for some 
government employees.  In some industries, such as construction, 
mining, and longshoring, there is a history of multiple employers 
negotiating one contract with a union. In many cases, however, one 
employer negotiates with one union and sometimes only one facility of 
the employer negotiates with one union.  Some contracts are negotiated 
on a national or statewide basis with local supplements, but many are 
exclusively local agreements. 
As discussed further below, these contracts are typically enforced 
using arbitration.  In the United States, the law relating to unions and 
collective bargaining and the protection of efforts to deal with the 
employer is known as labor law.  The law relating to all employees, union 
and nonunion, is known as employment law. 
The Italian system operates quite differently, being more 
regulated and affording more protections to the workers. Traditionally, 
the law governs certain areas of employment and others have been 
covered by collective agreements, generally negotiated on a much 
broader basis and covering many more workers than in the United States.  
Among the subjects traditionally regulated by law in Italy are many 
similar to the U.S., such as discrimination on grounds like marriage or 
pregnancy, nature of the work relationship (employment or self-
employment), social security, health and safety in the workplace, and 
protection for union activity.  In contrast to American law, however, 
Italian law provides protection against unjust dismissals.  Contracts in 
Italy cover subjects such as job duties, career development, special types 
of pay under the contract, violations of the disciplinary code, the notice 
period for termination of employment, and non-competition covenants. 
The two countries differ significantly in the form of unionization 
and the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. In Italy the 
organization of workers has occurred, with some rare exceptions such as 
managers and air traffic controllers, based on the type of employer for 
which they work.  As a result, trade unions operate in particular 
industries or sectors. The collective contracts are typically nationwide 
sector agreements containing the minimum economic and normative 
terms of employment for all the workers in a certain productive sector 
(the category), regardless of union membership.  For some areas or 
institutions of general interest, however, agreements may cover all 
categories of workers (inter-confederate agreements). This happened, for 
example, for individual and collective dismissal; before the legislature 
intervened to regulate the subject, the only regulation was contained in 
inter-confederate agreements. In some cases, collective bargaining 
follows individual local and territorial contexts, with specific norms for 
certain areas of the country (territorial agreements). It is the nationwide 
sector collective contract, however, that now represents the main 
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instrument of collective negotiation in the regulation of employment 
relationships and that governs the various types of collective contracts 
and agreements in Italy.3 
The relationships between contractual sources and legal sources in 
labor law are constructed hierarchically as in all of civil law, with the legal 
source having automatic prevalence over the contractual source.  This 
model is founded on a fundamental postulate: that the heteronomous 
source (the law) has the imperative task of safeguarding the fundamental 
rights - of freedom, dignity, safety - of the subordinate workers. 
Consequently, every norm produced from a contract – be it individual or 
collective - that lowers the system defined by the heteronomous precept 
will be annulled and replaced by the corresponding legal precept (in 
application of art. 1418 of the civil code). The law is unbreakable; it 
cannot be modified or waived by the contract. 
Until the 1970s there were few situations where law and contract 
overlapped.  Accordingly, there was a mutual relationship of non-
interference and, as a last resort in case of conflict, the law prevailed 
over the contract, a criterion of unbreakability in peius. 
At present, however, the overlap of autonomous (contractual) and 
heteronomous (legal) sources is the norm in the regulation of labor law, 
creating a situation of continual conflict, competition and, often, also 
integration between the various sources. In practice then, the 
relationship between autonomous and heteronomous sources is better 
explained in terms of competing sources – even though they are 
hierarchically ordered they do not simply follow an abstract hierarchical 
criterion. Contractual sources are today sometimes involved in actual 
normative procedures, as the presupposition for the law and as the 
content of the law. In many cases contractual sources deviate from legal 
sources (for example in the case of a change of worker’s duties); in 
others, laws are integrated (as in the case of the proposal of staff leasing 
legitimated during collective bargaining); in yet others, contractual 
agreements are proposed as alternative sources to the law for the 
regulation of employment relationships (illustrated by the case of the 
criteria of choice of workers to be dismissed collectively).4 
In all these cases, the legislature realizes that collective 
bargaining constitutes the most suitable instrument of social regulation 
and so does not exercise its regulatory power. Theoretical debate on the 
topic has for some time highlighted a progressive enrichment and 
                                                     
3  There are, however, some recent signs of change caused by the trend, common in all 
industrialized countries, of decentralized negotiation. 
4 According to the law no. 233/1991, in case of redundancy the workers to be dismissed 
must be selected on the basis of the criteria designed by an ad hoc collective agreement. If 
the collective parties fail to reach an agreement, the criteria are automatically provided by 
the law as follows: seniority, number of dependents of each worker, organizational reasons. 
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diversification of the functions of bargaining.  In an evolving economic 
and social context, bargaining has come to involve issues in which it does 
not perform its traditional acquisitive function regarding wage increases 
and new guarantees, but rather “administers” risks to which a group of 
workers are exposed. With increasing frequency in the last few decades, 
often thanks to specific legal delegation, collective bargaining has been 
entrusted with the additional task of collaborating in the organization of 
labor and in particular handling company crises and the ensuing 
employment problems. 
Having briefly reviewed the system of employment relations and 
the legal background in each of the two countries, the stage is now set to 
place arbitration in context as a part of the system in each country 
III. Arbitration in the U.S. and Italy 
A. The United States 
1. Labor Arbitration  
While labor unions in the United States initially resisted 
arbitration, a number of forces combined to encourage its acceptance and 
today it is the most common method of resolving disputes over the 
meaning and application of labor contracts.5 Both governmental 
encouragement and negotiation of arbitration agreements by unions and 
employers in major manufacturing industries fueled the growth of labor 
arbitration prior to World War II.6  As aptly stated in 1940 by Walter 
Reuther, a leader of the United Autoworkers Union,  
You cannot strike General Motors plants on individual 
grievances. One plant going down will affect the 60 other 
plants. You have to work out something to handle individual 
grievances .... I don't want to tie up 90,000 workers 
because one worker was laid off for two months. That is a 
case for the umpire.7 
During the war, the War Labor Board, created by the government 
to deal with labor disputes that might interfere with production of goods 
needed for the war, “encouraged and then required parties to include 
grievance arbitration provisions” in collective bargaining agreements, and 
to accept arbitration awards as binding.8  Today arbitration is included in 
virtually all collective bargaining agreements.   
In 1947, Congress added provisions to the National Labor 
Relations Act, which covers most private sector businesses, to encourage 
                                                     
5  See generally Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration:  The Early 
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373 (1983). 
6  Id. at 417-20. 
7  Id.  at 419. 
8 LAURA J. COOPER, et al., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 11-12 (3d ed. 2014).   
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unions and employers to use alternative dispute resolution methods to 
resolve disagreements over both contract negotiation and contract 
interpretation.9  Additionally, Congress made labor agreements 
enforceable in the federal courts.10  These changes further cemented 
arbitration as the method of choice for contract interpretation issues.  As 
for disputes over contract negotiation, mediation is, and has been, the 
choice for resolving private sector disputes. 
While refusing to enforce arbitration agreements in other contexts, 
in the middle of the 20th century, the Supreme Court decided that 
agreements to arbitrate disputes under collective bargaining agreements 
were enforceable as a matter of national labor policy.11 In a series of 
cases collectively known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court adopted 
standards that were very deferential to arbitration, enforcing both 
agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards.12  Because arbitration 
provisions in labor agreements were the quid pro quo for agreements not 
to strike, the Court concluded that the judicial hostility toward arbitration 
agreements in other contexts was not appropriate.13  “[A]rbitration of 
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel 
of the collective bargaining process itself.”14  Arbitration is the method of 
peacefully filling contractual gaps and resolving the disputes about the 
meaning of the contract, avoiding interruptions of production.15  
The Trilogy established that the courts should decide whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute but that absent the 
clearest evidence of exclusion from arbitration, the courts should order 
arbitration. 16  The Supreme Court cautioned the lower courts to avoid 
entanglement in the merits of the claim in deciding whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate.17  In the third Trilogy case, the Court adopted the 
same deference upon judicial review of arbitration awards.  The courts 
should not review the merits of the arbitrator’s decision, but should 
enforce the decision so long as the award “draws its essence from the 
collective bargaining agreement.”18  Over time another narrow exception 
to enforcement evolved, denying enforcement to arbitration awards that 
                                                     
9 Id. at 13; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 201, 203. 
10 29 U.S.C. §185. 
11 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
12 See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
13 363 U.S. at 578.  
14 Id. at 578. 
15 Id. at 581. 
16 Id. at 582-83. 
17 American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. 
18 Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597. 
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violate public policy.19  Based on the Trilogy and its progeny, few 
arbitration decisions under labor agreements are appealed and fewer still 
overturned by the courts.20  Since unionization in the private sector has 
decreased, however, there are fewer labor arbitrations. 
The parties to collective bargaining agreements determine the 
arbitration procedure and it varies widely, although some generalizations 
are possible.  The procedure is not commonly specified in the 
agreement.21  Many arbitration hearings follow a relatively formal, 
judicial-like format using opening and closing arguments, direct and 
cross-examination of witnesses, and in many cases, written post-hearing 
briefs to the arbitrator.  The rules of evidence that apply in court do not 
formally apply in arbitration.  Some parties choose more informal 
procedures and may omit briefs, formal statements, and even formal 
examination of witnesses.   Some unions and employers use attorneys in 
arbitration, while others prefer to employ trained lay representatives.   
Arbitrators are selected by the method negotiated by the parties.  
Most agreements provide for one neutral arbitrator, but some use a 
system of three or occasionally five, arbitrators, one or two chosen by 
each party and a neutral.  Most agreements provide that an arbitrator is 
chosen separately for each dispute, known as “ad-hoc”. Ad hoc 
arbitrators are chosen by mutual agreement or using the services of an 
impartial arbitration agency such as the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, a federal agency, the American Arbitration 
Association, a private organization, or a state or local government 
agency. When the parties receive a list of possible arbitrators from an 
agency, the most common method of choosing from the list involves 
alternately striking names until only one remains.  Some parties select 
one or a small group of arbitrators to serve as “permanent” arbitrator(s) 
for all the disputes arising during the course of the contract.   The use of 
permanent arbitrators reduces delay and eliminates the need to educate 
the arbitrator about the industry in each hearing.   
The arbitrators that conduct labor arbitrations are not licensed or 
regulated by the state.  Many arbitrators are lawyers, while others are 
academics or retired professionals, often from the field of labor relations 
or human resources.  Most arbitrate part-time, while some individuals 
earn a living as arbitrators. Arbitrators are paid by the parties, with the 
union and employer commonly dividing the cost of arbitration. 
                                                     
19 See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 63(2000) 
(recognizing public policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards but refusing to 
overturn arbitration award reinstating truck driver who twice tested positive for illegal drugs 
on public policy grounds).  
20 See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As The Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence On 
The Finality Of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. POL’Y REV. 191, 204 (2007). 
21  The description of the labor arbitration procedure that follows is drawn from COOPER, ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 19- 29. 
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Arbitrators typically issue written decisions supported by 
reasoning, days, weeks or sometimes months after the hearing.  In some 
cases, however, the parties request an immediate oral decision from the 
arbitrator.  There are several sources that publish the decisions of 
arbitrators where the parties agree.22  There is no systematic 
determination of which decisions are published.  Arbitration decisions are 
not precedential in the American system, but the parties’ expectations 
and the system of arbitral selection have resulted in development of a 
“common law” of arbitration that is followed by most arbitrators.23  
Arbitrators whose decisions are too far outside the mainstream of this 
common law run risk being deemed unacceptable by parties choosing 
arbitrators. 
Unionization in the governmental sector in the United States 
remains much higher than in the private sector.24  Collective bargaining 
law for government employees is established by individual states, with 
only the law for federal employees promulgated by the federal 
government.  Arbitration has become a feature of this sector as well, both 
for purposes of deciding issues of contract interpretation and for 
determining what the collective bargaining agreement will be when the 
parties cannot reach agreement in negotiations.  The latter form of 
arbitration, known as interest arbitration, is uncommon in the private 
sector, where strikes are allowed, but common in the public sector where 
most jurisdictions prohibit strikes.25  Arbitration of grievance disputes in 
the public sector developed later and more slowly than in the private 
sector.  The major factor slowing development of arbitration in this sector 
is concern about delegating the authority of the government to unelected 
arbitrators.26  Another factor is the many laws affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment of government employees, which frequently 
relate to or overlap with the provisions of collective bargaining 
contracts.27  These concerns caused courts initially to reject arbitration 
altogether and even after arbitration was accepted, to limit the authority 
of arbitrators by prohibiting arbitration of some disputes and refusing to 
enforce arbitration awards in others.28  While arbitration of public sector 
contract disputes has become more widely accepted over time, courts in 
public sector cases remain less deferential to arbitration.29   
All in all, labor arbitration as a method of settling contract 
interpretation disputes has been relatively noncontroversial in since the 
                                                     
22 COOPER, et al., supra note 8, at 1021-23. 
23 Id. at 285-88. 
24 See supra note 2. 
25 MARTIN H. MALIN, ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 611-12, 615 (2d ed. 2011) 
26 Id. at 677-78, 699. 
27 Id. at 718-50. 
28 Id. at 677-78, 718-50. 
29 Id. 
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mid-twentieth century in the private sector and in the last 20 years in the 
public sector as well.  Its success was a factor in the increasing 
consideration of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes in the 
nonunion workplace, commonly referred to as employment arbitration. 
2. Employment Arbitration 
The deference provided to labor arbitration agreements, 
particularly in the private sector, was not applied to other arbitration 
agreements.   While arbitration substitutes for “industrial strife” in labor 
contracts, in other cases it substitutes for litigation.30   Accordingly the 
courts initially refused to enforce such agreements at all.  In 1925, 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), making arbitration 
agreements enforceable.31  The statute contains language stating that 
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce."32 
Despite passage of the FAA, the Supreme Court refused to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate claims based on rights created by law, as 
opposed to claims of breach of contract.   In the 1980s, however, the 
Court’s view of arbitration began to change and it began to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate claims based on laws.33  In the early 1990s, this 
trend moved into employment law and the Court began to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate claims under employment law statutes, 
beginning with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.34  The Court 
concluded that an agreement to arbitration was merely an agreement to 
a different forum, not a waiver of rights.35  Unless the statute creating 
the claim barred arbitration, the Court would order arbitration.  The Court 
did not have to deal with the FAA’s exclusion for contracts of 
employment, however, because the arbitration provision in Gilmer was 
not contained in an employment agreement.36 
Ten years later in Circuit City v. Adams, the Court was faced with 
an arbitration agreement in an employment contract.37 The Court read 
the exclusion for employment contracts very narrowly, holding that it 
excluded only contracts of transportation workers like the expressly 
mentioned “seaman” and “railroad employees”, despite the fact that the 
                                                     
30 363 U.S. at 578. 
31 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925). 
32 9 U.S.C. §1. 
33 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
Shearson/American Exp. Inc. v. McMahon 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
34 Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
35  Id. at 29. 
36 Id. at 25 n.2. 
37  532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF WORKPLACE ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. AND ITALY 11 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 112/2014 
scope of interstate commerce is substantially broader today.38  This 
decision opened the door to widespread adoption and enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in employment. 
Since that time agreements to arbitrate have been enforceable, 
subject to certain limited defenses.  One is that the statute that gives rise 
to the dispute does not allow such agreements.39   Since most 
employment statutes were passed before such agreements were 
enforceable, they do not bar arbitration.40  Although the arbitration 
agreements are typically imposed on employees as a condition of 
employment, courts have rejected the argument that the employee’s lack 
of bargaining power alone is a defense to enforcement.41   
Other defenses to arbitration are that there was no agreement to 
arbitrate42 or that the employee cannot effectively vindicate the statutory 
rights in arbitration.43  In addition, the generally applicable defenses to 
the enforcement of any contract apply.44  In employment arbitration, the 
company chooses the arbitration system. Some agreements limit 
damages, shorten the statute of limitations for filing claims, require the 
employee to pay part of the costs of arbitration, limit the ability to bring a 
class action, permit the employer to choose the arbitrator, or limit 
discovery of evidence in the possession of the other party.45 There is 
much litigation about the enforceability of agreements which use a 
process that is not equivalent to that available in court.  Some courts 
have refused to enforce agreements with some or all of these provisions 
on grounds that the contract is unconscionable or that statutory rights 
cannot be vindicated.46  Other courts have ordered arbitration despite the 
differences from litigation47 and still others have liberally construed or 
modified the agreement to make it enforceable.48  Where the provisions 
are weighted too heavily in favor of the employer, even courts that 
                                                     
38  Id. at 119. 
39  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28. 
40  An exception is the whistleblower protections under the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial 
reform bill, which bars pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims.  See 
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(e). 
41  Id. at 33.  
42  See, e.g, Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no agreement to 
arbitrate claims filed by employee of contractor in Iraq for sexual assault which occurred 
after work hours in the employee’s bedroom in employer-provided housing.) 
43 See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2000) 
(recognizing defense but finding plaintiff failed to establish it). 
44 9 U.S.C. § 2 (requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements except “upon such grounds 
as exist at law or or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”) 
45 MARION G. CRAIN, ET. AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1058, 1063–4 (2d ed. 2011).   
46 Id. at 1062, 1067–73. 
47 See id. at 1063–64.   
48 See id. at 1060.   
12 MAURIZIO DEL CONTE  -  ANN C. HODGES 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 112/2014 
generally order arbitration will allow the employee to bring the claim in 
court.49   
The Supreme Court has become very favorably inclined to 
enforcing such agreements, despite efforts by lawyers representing 
employees.  In recent years the Court has decided many cases involving 
arbitration agreements unilaterally imposed on employees and consumers 
and most of the decisions favor arbitration.50  The Federal Arbitration Act 
has been found to preempt many state laws that limit enforcement of 
arbitration agreements,51 contrary to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
in other areas where the trend is to give more power to the states.  
Efforts to enact a comprehensive federal statute to prohibit imposition of 
such agreements on employees as a condition of employment have been 
unsuccessful.52  As a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions the grounds 
for refusing to enforce arbitration agreements are more limited, and the 
trend in the lower courts is toward enforcement. 
For many years a 1974 Supreme Court decision appeared to 
prohibit unions from agreeing with employers that employees would have 
to arbitrate legal claims,53 but as the Court became more favorably 
inclined toward arbitration a few lower courts enforced such 
agreements.54  In 2009, without reversing the 1974 decision, the 
Supreme Court held that a union’s agreement with an employer to 
arbitrate disputes arising under discrimination laws barred an employee 
from suing the employer in court for discrimination.55   To be enforceable, 
however, the agreement, must clearly and unequivocally waive the 
employees’ right to litigate.56  Additionally, the Court did not decide 
whether the employee was bound by the arbitration agreement if the 
union refused to arbitrate the employee’s claim, which is commonly the 
union’s right under the collective bargaining agreement.57  
The Supreme Court has also held that employees who agree to 
arbitration can still bring their cases to administrative enforcement 
agencies, which may bring legal claims in court on the employee’s behalf 
                                                     
49 See e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating 
“we hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules-especially the scheme whereby one 
party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-breaches the contract entered into by 
the parties”.) 
50 See infra notes 77-78, 82 and accompanying text.  
51 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
52 Arbitration Fairness Act Reintroduced to Curb Forced Arbitration for Consumers, Others, 
14 CLASS 606 (Issue No. 10, 05/24/13).  
53 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). 
54  See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001); Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996).  
55 14 Penn Plaza LLC  v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009). 
56 Wright v. Universal Marine Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1998). 
57 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 249. 
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despite the arbitration agreement.58  The employee’s arbitration 
agreement does not bind the agency, which has a public interest to 
vindicate in bringing the claim.59  Government agencies bring suit only in 
a very small number of cases, however.60 
Employment arbitration in the U.S. has been far more 
controversial than labor arbitration. It is imposed on individual employees 
without bargaining rights as a condition of employment using a system 
designed by the employer alone. It removes their right to go to court to 
vindicate legal rights.  Critics of employment arbitration complain that 
these agreements deprive unsuspecting employees of important rights 
like a jury trial.61  Additionally, courts have enforced agreements that 
limit damages, shorten the statute of limitations for bringing claims, and 
require the employees to pay costs that they would not have to pay in 
court.  Critics argue that arbitration will limit public exposure of 
discrimination, decreasing the deterrent effect of the laws and allowing 
patterns of discrimination to continue.  A related concern is that 
development of the law may be suppressed, with fewer judicial opinions 
interpreting statutes.  Others are concerned that arbitration may provide 
a kind of second class justice especially where there is no control over 
arbitrator quality.62  A related concern is that, unlike labor arbitration, 
employers will be repeat players in arbitration while employees will not.63  
Thus employers may be able to secure more favorable arbitrators, 
because they are more knowledgeable about their qualifications, and 
more favorable decisions, because the arbitrator will want to ensure 
future business.64 
Proponents of arbitration suggest that a quicker, cheaper method 
of dispute resolution may benefit employees, particular those with small 
claims that are unattractive to the plaintiffs’ bar because of the small 
legal fees generated.65   While some employees may win large jury 
verdicts in a litigation system, many others cannot get to court because 
of the cost of litigation.  Some argue that there is no real evidence of a 
                                                     
58 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002). 
59 Id. at 295-96. 
60 For example, in 2012 the EEOC received 99,412 charges of discrimination and brought 
suit in only 155 cases. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm; EEOC Litigation Statistics FY 
1997 through FY 2012, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm. 
61 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the 
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2003). 
62 This concern has abated in the courts but not among arbitration’s critics. 
63 Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:  Case Outcomes 
and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 11-16, 20 (2011). 
64 Id.  
65 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 562 (2001); 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91 (2001). 
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repeat player effect in arbitration and that indeed, employees win 
arbitration cases on a regular basis.  They argue that while employees 
may trade off certain rights they gain benefits from agreeing to 
arbitration and it should be permissible.  In response to the complaint 
that arbitration should be at the employee’s option rather than imposed 
by the employer, arbitration’s fans assert that it is inefficient for an 
employer to establish an arbitration system if it cannot insure that 
employees will utilize it.  Proponents also urge that there are many 
incentives for complying with the law and the prospect of a large and 
public jury verdict is only one; most employers will comply based on the 
risk of arbitration claims, bad publicity and administrative enforcement, 
as well as employee morale and retention.  Finally, some commentators 
have suggested that arbitration is less beneficial for employers than may 
initially appear.66 
Empirical studies of arbitration show mixed results.  Some 
employees win arbitration cases, although evidence indicates that 
employee victories are more common in cases based on contracts than in 
cases involving legal claims.67  Labor arbitrators under union contracts 
rule for employees more often than employment arbitrators.68  There is 
some evidence that employees prevail more often in arbitration than in 
court, although the validity and significance of this evidence is much 
debated.69  The evidence also suggests that employees receive greater 
monetary damages in court than arbitration but the studies do not 
consider cases that settle prior to litigation, which may affect their 
validity.70  And low wage employees may have more opportunity to 
pursue their claims in arbitration.71  These studies have fueled though not 
settled the debate about the use of employment arbitration. 
Among the recent controversies is the enforcement of employment 
arbitration agreements that limit class or collective claims, which involve 
groups of employees or consumers joining together to sue their employer 
                                                     
66 Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory 
Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 421-440 (2000). 
67 Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of 
Employment Arbitration System Has Developed, at pp. 22-23, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
(forthcoming 2014); Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace 
Disputes in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 380 (Kenneth G. DauSchmidt et 
al., eds. 2009).   
68 Id. at 380, 387, 390. 
69 Id. at 373.  For a more recent study, see Colvin & Pike, supra note 67, at 29 (showing win 
rates and damage awards lower than litigated cases, particularly when the individually 
negotiated agreements of high level employees are separated from employer-mandated 
arbitration). 
70 Id. at 383-385. 
71 Id. at 385, 390.  But see Colvin & Pike, supra note 67, at 32 (finding most cases in 
arbitration will not be economically viable, leading to a system which is not accessible to 
employees). 
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF WORKPLACE ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. AND ITALY 15 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 112/2014 
or business.  Such actions are available under most U.S. employment 
laws.72   They are particularly beneficial where each individual has small 
damages since an individual lawsuit would require the employee to spend 
more to litigate the case than is at stake. If many employees with the 
same claim can join together, the cost of litigation is shared, the process 
is more efficient, and the employer held to account.  For the employer, 
class actions can be expensive and time-consuming to litigate.73 They 
may attract media attention and adversely affect a company’s 
reputation.74  Accordingly, there is substantial pressure on companies to 
settle such claims.75  These pressures motivate businesses to seek ways 
to avoid class actions. Arbitration agreements offer an appealing vehicle 
to reach such a result, enhanced by recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court.76 
In 2010, the Court ruled in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp. that a party could not be ordered to arbitrate class 
claims unless the arbitration agreement specifically provided for class 
arbitration.77  Then in 2011, the Court held in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion that a state law that invalidated certain arbitration 
agreements that precluded class claims was preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act and thus unenforceable.78   These cases make arbitration 
agreements that ban class actions enforceable, allowing employers to 
escape class action claims. Critics argue that this allows employers to 
avoid liability altogether because the cost will prevent many employees 
from arbitrating individually. 
A more recent development may make this device less useful to 
employers, however.  In January 2012, the National Labor Relations 
Board held that employers who promulgate arbitration agreements that 
prohibit employees from filing class actions in both arbitration and court 
violate the employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, which is 
protected by the National Labor Relations Act.79  The court of appeals 
                                                     
72 See Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 204-05 (2003). 
73 Deborah A. Sudbury, et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: Avoiding Employment 
Class Actions, EMP. REL. L.J. at 20 (Autumn 2000). 
74  Id. at 21. 
75  Id. at 6, 22-23. 
76  Because these cases were decided under the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs 
arbitration of most employment law claims, they apply in employment cases.   
77 559 U.S. 662.  Where the parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide whether a class 
action was permissible under a contract that was silent on the issue, however, the Court 
followed its general policy of deference and refused to set aside the arbitrator’s 
interpretation that the agreement allowed class actions. Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 
S.Ct. 2064 (2013). 
78 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
79 D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012). The statute does not cover government 
employees, agricultural employees, employees of railroads and airlines, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
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denied enforcement of the decision, however,80 and many other courts 
have refused to follow the decision.81 
Most recently, a 2013 decision by the Supreme Court in an 
antitrust case contributes further to the primacy of arbitration and its 
ability to prevent class actions.  In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, the Court enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement between merchants.82  The Court found that the law did not 
ban class action waivers nor guarantee the right to bring a class claim, 
even if an individual claim would cost more to litigate than was available 
in damages.  This case seems likely to encourage more employers to use 
arbitration agreements to limit employee class actions and also casts 
doubt on the viability of the defense to arbitration based on inability to 
vindicate a statutory claim in arbitration.  
B. Italian Arbitration 
In contrast to the United States, arbitration in the workplace in 
Italy has been limited. Italy’s civil law system is more protective of 
workers than U.S. law and that tradition is reflected in the judicial and 
legislative treatment of arbitration.  Much of the legal development 
relating to arbitration has been statutory and only recently has arbitration 
similar to that in the U.S. been permitted by law.   
Arbitration in Italy was first recognized by the law in 1865. "About 
conciliation and settlement" was the "preliminary title" of the Italian code 
of civil procedure which recognized arbitration, allowing litigants to opt 
for an alternative to state judicial power to resolve civil disputes.83 Art. 20 
sets forth that the "arbiters decide in conformity with the rules of law 
where the settlement may not have authorized them to reach such 
amicable compromise as might have been wished for." 
Such wording drew a line between two types of arbitration that 
remains today.  Ritual arbitration must conform to the positive rules of 
law, which set out the structure, proceedings, and outcome of the 
process.  In ritual arbitration, the award is vested with the same import 
as any decision by a judicial body.  In contrast is non-ritual arbitration, 
where the parties entrust a third party (a sole arbiter or board) to reach 
such agreement as will resolve the controversy that arose between the 
parties.   Non-ritual arbitration is far less constrained by law.  The 
decisions and processes in ritual arbitrations follow the civil procedure 
code, whereas in the case of non-ritual arbitrations, also known as 
                                                                                                                                         
152(2), (3), supervisors or managers.  29 U.S.C. §§152 (2), (3), (11); NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Corp., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
80 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (denying enforcement in relevant part).   
81 Id. at 362. 
82 133 S.C. 2304 (2013). 
83 Satta, Commentario al codice di procedura civile IV 2 Milan 1971, 162 
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contractual arbitrations, it is up to the arbiters to draw up the parameters 
of the arbitration, such as the processes and rules of the forum.84 
Arbitration was first introduced in the legal system to resolve 
employment disputes in 1893. Act #15, June 1893, n° 295. Act #15 
vested the arbitration panel committee with a judicial function in 
controversies with a ceiling of lire 200, in addition to the prevalent 
conciliatory function, but left the parties free to grant the panel the 
flexibility of arbitration.85  Despite this development, for many years 
thereafter both the law and practice hindered the use of arbitration in 
workplace disputes.  
During much of the twentieth century arbitrations arising from 
individual contracts were permitted, but the law prohibited arbitration 
provisions in collective agreements and arbitrations of individual disputes 
arising from collective agreements.86  Both legal restrictions on individual 
arbitration87 and suspicions of private justice and its protection of workers 
limited the use of arbitration in the workplace.88 But, as procedure 
experts point out, some trade unions and employers began to experiment 
with some forms of non-ritual conciliation and arbitration by including in 
collective contracts settlement clauses that were in derogation of the 
strict rules of employment legal proceedings, leading to legal reform in 
Act #532, 11/8/1973.89   
Although this law authorized non-ritual arbitration where provided 
by law or contract, it allowed the parties to go to court instead so long as 
they did so within the terms provided by the contract. 90 The law also 
authorized judicial review of the merits of the award for “breach of the 
law or the contracts or collective agreements."91   As a result of the broad 
scope of judicial review, the parties rarely used arbitration but instead 
went directly to court except in cases involving dismissals of top 
managers.92  
                                                     
84 Biamanti, voc. Arbitrato (dir. proc. civ.) in Enc. Dir. II, 2 Milan 1958 p. 934 ff. 
85 Cecchella L’arbitrato nelle controversie di lavoro, Milano 1990, 37 
86 Flammia Voce arbitrato III Arbitrato e conciliazione in materia di lavoro. Enc. Giur. 
Treccani VIII aggiornamento. Rome 2000, I.  
87 The code of civil procedure of 1940, in its eighth title dedicated to arbitration (art. 806ff-
831), provided only for individual arbitration and expressly excluded its application to 
industrial disputes of any kind and to social security issues. Punzi L’arbitrato nelle 
controversie di lavoro in Riv. Arb. 2001, 389ff. 
88 Tarzia Manuale del processo lavoro 5, Milan 2008, 56 
89 Punzi L’arbitrato in materia di lavoro: fonti e impugnazioni, in Mass. Giur. Lav. 2010, p. 
353. 
90 See Tarzia, supra note 88, at 67. 
91 Art. 5, § 2. 
92 Vallebona Una buona svolta del diritto del lavoro: il “collegato” 2010, in Mass. Giur. Lav., 
2010, p. 210.  One of the fathers of labor law called this law “the slaying of arbitration,” 
noting that the unions and their lawyers were indispensable in its passage but effectively 
rendered arbitration a nullity by the limitations. See Giugni Il diritto del lavoro negli anni 80 
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The move toward true arbitration began at the end of the 
twentieth century, with legislation that expanded the availability of 
arbitration while still retaining for the parties the right to go to court on 
any claim.  In 1990, individual dismissals became subject to non-ritual 
arbitration after compulsory conciliation if both parties agreed.93  The 
legislature later broadened the controversies on which arbitration was 
permissible.94 The new provisions, part of the civil procedure code,95 
authorized non-ritual arbitration after mandatory conciliation96 where 
provided by national contracts or collective accords.  In addition, the 
legislature abrogated the provision from the 1973 law allowing broad 
judicial review.97 Art. 412 °4 limited review to a single employment 
tribunal judge in the jurisdiction where the controversy occurred.  The 
time limit filing the appeal was thirty days from notification of the award 
and the judge’s decision was final. 
The judge could set aside the award:  
1) If the arbitration agreement was invalid or the arbiters 
exceeded their authority and the exception was raised in the 
arbitral proceedings; 
2) If the arbiters were not appointed as required by the 
arbitration agreement; 
3) If the award was rendered by an ineligible arbiter as defined 
in art. 812; 
4) If the arbiters did not stay within the conditions set  by the 
parties for the award to be valid;  
5) If the arbitral proceedings did not allow both parties the 
opportunity to present their case and to reply to the 
                                                                                                                                         
in Gior. Dir. Lav. Rel. Ind. 1982, at 382, 400; Giugni Intervista in Riv. It. Dir. Lav. 1992, I, 
438.  For further analysis of the restrictions of the law, see Vallebona, supra, at 210, 214. 
93  See Act #108/1990. 
94   See art. 808 °3 of the civil procedure code which broadens the authority for non-ritual 
arbitration: "The parties may agree in writing, that in lieu of the provisions of art. 824-bis, 
the controversy may be decided by arbiters by contractual determination. In all other cases, 
the provisions of the present title shall apply.”   
95  See art. 412 °3 and 412 °4 of the civil procedure code. 
96 As in the case of arbitration for individual dismissals, arbitration must be preceded by 
conciliation, a prerequisite to any legal action regarding employment. See Luiso Tentativo 
obbligatorio di conciliazione nelle controversie di lavoro in Riv. It. Dir. Lav. 1999, ff375; 
Capponi Le fonti degli arbitrati in materia di lavoro in Mass. Giur. Lav. 2010 p. 357. If 
conciliation fails, the parties decide a) the method of initiating an arbitration request and 
the period of time the other party has to agree; b) the composition of the arbitration board 
and the procedure for the appointment of the president and members; c) the forms and 
methods of any investigation; d) the deadline for the award and notification to the parties; 
and e) the arbitrators’ pay. The non-ritual arbitral procedure remains an alternative form of 
resolution as the parties are at all times free to opt for court action or to request the arbitral 
board of right or any other form of arbitration expressly provided at law (e.g., the one 
previously mentioned for individual dismissals). 
97  See Legislative Decrees #80/1998 and #387/1998. 
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opponent’s case, an essential principle in the Italian legal 
system that we have translated as confrontation.  
The arbitral award is expressly defined as a "contractual award", 
so it cannot be overturned for breach of the rules of law and collective 
rules pertaining to the merits of the controversy, but solely for the 
reasons set forth above.  Thus, the review is more similar to that in the 
U.S. with the exception of confrontation, which is not required in U.S. 
arbitration. 
Despite legislative changes that allow more arbitration, 
controversies may be decided by arbiters only where the law or the 
collective contracts and accords provide for it.  Also, unlike the U.S., the 
parties always remain free to reject arbitration for any particular dispute 
and go to court, despite a contractual or legal provision for arbitration.  
Even after the law changed, legal scholarship heavily slanted in favor of 
workers argued that controversy over the "validity of the award" still 
referred to the violation of rules at law pertaining to the merits of the 
controversy.98  Collective agreements lost no time insuring that awards 
could still be challenged on the merits in court, thus depriving the 
legislation of the intended arbitral finality.99   
The latest development in Italian arbitration occurred in 2010, in 
the "employment reform package."100  This law provided for true 
arbitration, enabling the parties to choose between public and private 
avenues of remedy for controversies that have arisen and which may 
arise in future.  Non-ritual arbitration is allowed, on the basis of collective 
accord provisions agreed to by the more representative trade 
associations and certified by the commissions set up by the Provincial 
Employment Bureau, in front of arbitral chambers instituted by 
certification bodies101 or, last but not least, in front of a board set up at 
the instigation of the parties to the controversy. 
                                                     
98 See Vallebona, supra note 92, at 210.  The serious limitations to the arbitral institution 
were also stressed by Tarzia, who noted that the award was less binding than the statement 
of the minutes of conciliation drawn up at the office of the union or in front of the 
commission.  See Tarzia, supra note 88, at 68. 
99 See Vallebona, supra note 92, at 211. 
100  art. 31 of Act #183/2010. 
101 The Biagi reform (Act #30, 14/2/2003, and Legislative Decree 10 September 2003 
#276) introduced certification bodies into the legal system to reduce legal disputes under 
collective agreements regarding the status of workers as employees or independent 
contractors. The purpose of certification is to assure the free will of the parties in signing 
the contract. The certification procedure, supervised by an appointed commission, starts 
with agreement of both parties and must contain the specifications of the contract for which 
certification is requested. The procedure ends by an ordinance of either certification or 
rejection, determining whether the contract is for employment or independent contractor 
status.  A positive certification makes it impossible to question the determination of worker 
status absent a legal decision on the issue. 
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In contrast to U.S. arbitration, the statute contains more detailed 
prescriptions regarding the arbitration procedure, which in the U.S. is left 
to the parties. The previous text of art. 412 °4, c.c.p., was replaced by 
the wording: "without prejudice to the right of each of the respective 
parties to take legal action and to resort to the conciliation and arbitration 
procedure provided at law, the controversies listed under art. 409 may 
also be submitted to the non-ritual conciliation and arbitration board 
instituted in the following terms,” which state procedural rules.  The 
petitioner must reference the points of law in support of the claim and 
may also include a request to decide ex aequo et bono, which means in 
respect to the general principles of the legal system and the regulatory 
principles regarding the subject matter, also deriving from EU law. 
If the respondent accepts the conciliation and arbitration 
procedure, it appoints its own arbiter, who has thirty days from 
notification of the appointment to select, with the other arbiter, the 
president (a neutral arbiter) and the place for the meeting of the board. 
If the arbiters do not agree, the petitioner may request the president of 
the court of the district to appoint the neutral arbiter and decide the 
location of the arbitration. The controversy is decided within twenty days 
of the hearing by the issuance of an award. 
The award of the arbiters, duly authenticated, carries "the force of 
law on the parties", the same as art. 1372 of the civil code dealing with 
contracts.  Controversies about the validity of the non-ritual arbitral 
award, which may be challenged within thirty days of notification, are 
decided by review of the court with first level jurisdiction. Once the 
deadline for appeal has expired, if the parties have declared in writing 
that they accept the decision or, if the challenge is rejected by the 
tribunal, the judge, upon request of the parties and having verified the 
procedural propriety of the award, declares it valid and enforceable. 
The noteworthy change allows the parties that opt for non-ritual 
arbitration to agree that the award may not be challenged in front of a 
judge for violation of collective contracts and accords and rules of law 
pertaining to the merit of the controversy, as is permitted in ritual forms 
of arbitration.102  Thus, employment disputes resolved by contractual 
arbitration are subject to challenge, as in art. 808 °3, c.c.p, only where 
the arbitral convention is invalid, the arbiters overstepped the limits of 
the mandate,  the appointment of arbiters was not in conformance with 
convention, the arbiters had legal incapacity, the arbiters violated the 
rules set down by the parties, or the requirement of  confrontation is 
violated. Such requirements are essentially procedural and do not bear 
on the merits, similar to the U.S.  With this limitation on the scope of 
review, however, came a prohibition on arbitrating dismissal cases. 
                                                     
102 A. Vallebona L’arbitrato irrituale nel sistema del diritto del lavoro dopo il “Collegato”, in 
Mass. Giur. Lav., 2010, p. 363. 
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Under the 2010 reform, parties to an individual employment 
contract are also allowed (under §8 art. 31, Act #183/2010) to agree to 
non-ritual arbitration for any controversy that may arise from the 
contract, precluding in advance any recourse to legal action.  Such a 
clause is enforceable only if "certified", in order to ensure "the effective 
will of the parties to assign to arbiters any such controversy as may arise 
from the employment contract."103  Such a covenant reproduces the 
aspects of arbitration set forth in art. 808, §1, c.c.p., which may be 
included in the contract or in a separate document. 
Doubts about the constitutionality of the form of the arbitration 
clause seem groundless. Some critics have argued that the new 
procedure would clash with art. 101 of the Constitution providing "no 
special judges may be instituted", and with art. 24, which guarantees 
free access to a judge for the protection of one's rights. 
In no way, however, does the new legal procedure impinge on the 
parties’ right to call upon the judicial authority and to resort to the range 
of conciliation and arbitration procedures provided by law. Any party to 
the employment contract may refuse to agree to an arbitration procedure 
suggested by the other party, because arbitration remains, in every form, 
an option for the parties and not mandated by law.104  
Under labor law, art. 412 °4 regulates invalidation of non-ritual 
arbitration as follows: "Controversies regarding the validity of the non-
ritual arbitral award pursuant to art. 808 °3 c.c.p., are decided by a 
single employment judge." Such wording caused some concern that use 
of the term "validity" might authorize judicial review of the merits of the 
controversy. Yet, such position is untenable because the term "validity" is 
simply meant to connect non-ritual arbitration with the model of 
invalidation, which is exclusively procedural.105 And in any event, 
invalidation of an arbitral award is lawful where it violates inalienable 
provisions at law and in collective accords.106  
Lastly, the new art. 412 °4 c.c.p., enables the parties to ask 
arbiters to decide ex aequo et bono.107 Since, according to the same 
provision, a decision ex aequo et bono must be handed down "with 
respect to the general principles of the legal system and the regulatory 
principles of the subject matter, such as flow from EU law", court practice 
                                                     
103 For the certification procedure see note 101. 
104 On that issue and on good practice in the use of non-ritual arbitration, see Vallebona, 
supra note 92, at 216.  Cf. Capponi, supra note 96, at 357. 
105 For a brief compilation of the issues raised by the new non-ritual arbitration system, see 
Capponi, supra note 96, at 361. 
106 For example the provisions regarding health and safety, the right to organize, decent 
salary and all the rights directly or indirectly protected by the Constitution. See E. Ghera, L. 
Valenti, Un primo commento al Collegato lavoro, in Mass. Giur. Lav., 2010, at 864. 
107 This concept is similar to equity in the American legal system. 
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has found that "there does not seem to exist a big difference, considering 
the transactional nature of non-ritual awards, between award at law and 
award ex aequo et bono.”108 
 In summary, arbitration that is more final and binding is 
now possible under Italian law, with judicial review for procedural defects 
in the decision.  However, the parties always remain free to avoid 
arbitration and resort to the courts for enforcement of either contractual 
or legal rights. 
Having reviewed the law and practice of workplace arbitration 
under the U.S. and Italian systems, it is now possible to consider the 
similarities and differences between the systems. 
IV. Similarities and Differences  
A. Comparison between the two systems 
The foregoing discussion of arbitration in the labor and 
employment sector in Italy and the United States reveals a few 
similarities, but far more differences between the two countries.   This 
section will first discuss the similarities and then the differences, 
reflecting on the reasons for the differences.  It is clear that each system 
has evolved in its own way based on the unique nature of the legal 
system and the culture of the workplace.  
Laws in both Italy and the United States authorized arbitration 
long before it developed as a practice in the employment field.  In both 
countries, there has been resistance to arbitration in the labor and 
employment law arena, although arbitration is far more widely accepted 
today in the U.S. than in Italy.  And arbitration is a voluntary process in 
both countries, although employees in the U.S. may have no real voice in 
whether to arbitrate employment claims.  In both countries, arbitration is 
quicker than litigation in most cases, but that has not convinced most 
parties with a choice, outside of the collective bargaining context in the 
U.S. and highly paid employees in both countries, to adopt arbitration to 
resolve most disputes.  Judicial review is limited to procedural violations 
rather than the merits in both countries, with the exception of ritual 
arbitration in Italy.  Finally, in both countries, there are legal limitations 
on arbitrating certain types of claims.  
Far more significant than the similarities are the differences 
between the two countries.  Some of these differences are rooted in the 
differing legal traditions, with the U.S being a common law country and 
Italy a civil law country.  Thus, most, though certainly not all, of the 
development in U.S. arbitration has been in collective bargaining and the 
courts, while in Italy it is in legislative enactments.  Additionally, Italy has 
                                                     
108 Ghera & Valenti, supra note 103, at 860. 
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a much stronger tradition of protecting workers’ rights in both the courts 
and the legislature.  This tradition and the political force that keeps it in 
place have resisted the spread of arbitration, since the courts are viewed 
as protectors of workers’ rights.  
One major difference is that arbitration under collective bargaining 
agreements, known as labor arbitration, has, for over half a century, 
been widely accepted in the U.S. to resolve disputes between unions and 
employers about the meaning and application of the agreement.  Both 
labor and management have accepted this system as an effective 
substitute for both economic action, such as the strike, and judicial 
enforcement.  It is used almost exclusively to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements.  
No similar acceptance of arbitration is evident in Italy.  This may 
reflect in part the different labor relations systems in the two countries, 
with the U.S. more clearly separating contract and law. 109  The U.S. labor 
arbitration system evolved at a time when there were few legal rights for 
employees.  Almost all rights came from the negotiated agreement.  
Further, in the U.S. just cause protection from termination remains a 
contractual protection, commonly available in the private sector almost 
exclusively to employees covered by a union contract, 110 while in Italy 
such protection exists by law.  A related explanation is the focus of U.S. 
unions on what has been called “business unionism” or “bread and 
butter” unionism.111 While there has almost always been a more radical 
element in the American labor movement, over time it has diminished in 
size and the philosophy of business unionism prevailed.112  The focus of 
most unions has been to negotiate and enforce favorable terms and 
conditions of employment with their employer, with the primary 
enforcement mechanism being the grievance and arbitration 
procedure.113 
Under the Italian legal system, there is no distinction between 
rights based on the law and rights based on the contract, since according 
to Article 1372 of the Civil Code, "the contract has the force of law 
between the parties".  Instead, there is distinction between laws 
governing contracts, which may provide for mandatory or nonmandatory 
rules. Provisions of labor law are in most cases mandatory. The 
exemption from mandatory rules is generally permitted only if it benefits 
                                                     
109  For an analysis of the detrimental effects of this separation for employees, see generally 
Stone, supra note 2.  
110 The exception is the state of Montana, which has a statute requiring just cause for 
termination. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2013). 
111 KENNETH DAU-SCHMIDT, ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 34, 84 (2014). 
112 Id. at 34-38, 71-74, 83-85. 
113 Id. at 84.  For a criticism of labor arbitration as detrimental to employee rights, see 
Stone, supra note 2, at 629-31. 
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the employee. Some rules allow limited flexibility, those related to 
working hours for example, but the general rules (vacation, illness, 
pregnancy, birth of a child, rest, right to strike, and especially those 
related to the termination of the employment relationship) are 
mandatory. 
Indeed, the mandatory nature of the right to strike in Italy 
illustrates another significant difference between the two systems.  In 
Italy, any limitation on the right to strike arising from an arbitration 
agreement might violate the Italian law barring "anti-union activity" by 
the employer. In such cases, the union is entitled to bring a claim before 
the Labor Court in order to have the union-busting ceased and the status 
quo restored. The Court injunction has indirect impact on the individual 
workers’ positions (for instance, reinstatement to their jobs if the anti-
union conduct of the company resulted in dismissal). The Court 
injunction, which is issued at the end of a quick procedure, may be 
contested by the employer before the Labor Court.  While the U.S. also 
prohibits discrimination based on union activity as well as other 
interference with such rights,114 limits on striking based on arbitration 
agreements are not considered violations of the law.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has held that a contract that provides for arbitration of 
disputes implicitly includes a prohibition on the right to strike, even if the 
parties did not negotiate any such limits, and despite the express legal 
protection for the right to strike.115 
Since the Italian system does not utilize what is known in the 
United States as labor arbitration, the comparison between the two 
systems is meaningful only in relation to the employment arbitration, 
which for both jurisdictions, has as its object the worker's rights provided 
by law or contract. 
Arbitration of legal disputes116 between individual employees and 
employers is still resisted by many in the United States. Most academic 
commentators have been critical of the judicial trend toward enforcement 
of unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements.117 Similarly, when 
expressly questioned about arbitration, most employees support it only 
where the system is fair and the majority of them oppose mandatory 
arbitration of legal claims as a condition of employment.118 Courts, 
however, have widely accepted and enforced “agreements” to arbitrate 
                                                     
114 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3). 
115 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). 
116 As distinguished from contractual disputes. 
117 Jean Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory 
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
831, 837-39 (2002); Matthew W. Finkin, Privatization of Wrongful Dismissal Protection in 
Comparative Perspective, 37 INDUS. L.J. 149, 166-67 (2008). 
118  Id. at166. 
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all disputes related to employment imposed unilaterally by employers on 
individual employees without bargaining power.   
The explanation for the different approach to employment 
arbitration in Italy and the U.S. is rooted largely in differences in the 
judicial systems. While the courts in Italy actively protect the rights of 
workers, the courts in the U.S. and in particular the Supreme Court, 
which has driven much of the move toward arbitration, are far more 
inclined to support business.119  A recent empirical analysis of judicial 
decisions in the Supreme Court from 1946-2011 concluded that in the 
1960s there was a decline in the Court’s support of business interests, 
but the pro-business inclination began to increase with the Burger Court 
in 1969.120  While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1969-2004) were 
favorable to business, the Roberts Court, which began in 2005, has 
exceeded the two previous Courts in its pro-business orientation.121  
Indeed five of the ten justices most favorable to business in the time 
period of the study are current members of the Roberts Court.122 The 
study also demonstrated that justices appointed by Democratic 
presidents, who would generally be expected to be less favorable to 
business, have, over time become more supportive of business 
interests.123  
A subsequent analysis of the 2011-12 term of the Court concluded 
that the decisions of that term, including both consumer124 and 
employment cases, favored business even more clearly than decisions in 
earlier terms of the Roberts Court.125  Consistent with the earlier study, 
analysis of the 2011-12 term showed that even liberal leaning justices 
                                                     
119 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 
(2008) (calling the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Roberts the most pro-business 
court since the 1930s); Sternlight, supra note 117, at 855-56 (suggesting corporate 
influence as an explanation for the differing acceptance of arbitration in the U.S. and most 
other countries). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right:  A Response 
to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 1008 (2008) (acknowledging the Court as pro-
business in certain respects but suggesting it is not extremely so). 
120 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013). 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 1472-73. 
124 As noted supra note 76, several of the cases that impact employment arbitration were 
consumer cases applicable to employment law because both arise under the FAA.  
125 Corey Ciochetti, The Constitution, The Roberts Court, And Business: The Significant 
Business Impact Of The 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 385, 
419-36, 444, 460-63 (2013) (analyzing the 2011-12 term of the Court and concluding that 
while prior Roberts Court terms were not uniformly pro-business, the term analyzed was 
quite clearly pro-business).  The author also found that the Court both narrowed and 
expanded statutes and constitutional provisions to reach the decisions favorable to 
business.  Id.at 461. 
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ruled with business in a number of cases where there was a reasonable 
argument on the other side of the case.126 
In addition to pro-business leanings, an alternative, or perhaps 
complementary, explanation of the Roberts Court’s rulings from a more 
conservative commentator is the Court’s view that litigation, and 
particularly complex litigation, is not an effective method of resolving 
disputes.127  A somewhat similar explanation is offered by Professor 
Matthew Bodie, who suggests that the Roberts Court supports private 
enforcement of law, including compliance efforts by employers’ human 
resources departments, in lieu of litigation.128  While Professor Bodie does 
not focus on arbitration, deferring disputes to arbitration is consistent 
with a focus on shifting from litigation to employer enforcement of legal 
norms. 
A third plausible explanation for the Supreme Court’s infatuation 
with arbitration is that the Court is simply clearing its docket of cases by 
enforcing agreements for private justice.129  Professor Finkin argues that 
this is the most persuasive explanation of the shift in the Court’s view of 
arbitration because the corporate influence on the Court is, at best, 
indirect.130  Further, the judicial shift to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements coincides with the expansion of judicial claims available to 
employees, making reducing the docket more attractive.131 
Each of these rationales has some force as an explanation for the 
extraordinary acceptance of employment arbitration by the Supreme 
Court, which has driven acceptance by other courts.  Depending on the 
particular case, the lineup of justices favoring arbitration may vary, based 
on the views of the justices and the countervailing arguments.132 The 
                                                     
126 Id. at 460-61. 
127 See Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three:  A Response, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 
1015, 1025 (2008) (acknowledging the Court’s pro-business bent but suggesting that a 
more persuasive explanation for the Court’s decision is its skepticism about the value of 
litigation). 
128 Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 159 , 161-62 (2013) 
129 Finkin, supra note 117, at 167, quoting IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 172 
(1992). 
130 Id. at 165.  Professor Finkin also argues that the votes of individual justices on 
arbitration cases do not always track the political views of the appointing president.,id  
which is consistent with the findings of scholars analyzing the business orientation of the 
Supreme Court.  Perhaps, however, that fact doesn’t completely denigrate business 
orientation as an explanation for the Court’s decisions but instead shows the pervasiveness 
of business influence, particularly when combined with the interest in reducing court 
dockets. 
131 Id. at 168. 
132 For example, the more recent cases restricting class actions and allowing unions to waive 
employee rights to litigate are largely 5-4 or 5-3 (Justice Sotomayor recused herself in two 
of the cases), with the conservatives in the majority and the more liberal or moderate 
justices in dissent.  See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740; Stolt Nielsen v. 
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combination of pro-business orientation and the appeal of alternatives to 
litigation has led to law that permits employers to force employees into 
arbitration for both contractual and legal rights, and to restrict their 
ability to bring claims on a class basis.  Further, the fact that the 
opponents of arbitration have not been able to obtain legislative reversal 
of the Court decisions suggests that the power of business and the 
weakness of the employee/consumer lobby has an influence on the 
acceptance of employment arbitration.  The failure legislative efforts may 
also reflect a lack of widespread knowledge or active concern about the 
impact of arbitration on employees and consumers.  The lack of class 
consciousness in the U.S. and the reduced influence of labor unions 
exacerbates this absence of focus on the loss of rights. 
In contrast to the U.S,, Italian law secures the right of each party 
to bring a claim before the judicial authority, whether asserting a 
violation of law or contract, and to use the different procedures of 
conciliation and arbitration provided by law. Each party can always reject 
a proposal for arbitration advanced by the other party, because 
arbitration, in all forms, is a free choice of the parties, not imposed by 
law.  For this reason, the agreement to arbitrate must be expressed by 
the employee in relation to each dispute and arbitration clauses are not 
allowed in employment contracts as in the United States. 
The exception in Italy is the recent Act 183 of 2010, which allows 
non-ritual arbitration,133 similar to employment arbitration in the U.S., in 
limited circumstances.  Under this new law, the following rigorous 
conditions must be met: 
1) the arbitration clauses must have been established by cross-sector 
agreements or collective bargaining agreements signed by the most 
representative organizations of employers and employees at 
national level;  
2)  the certification bodies before which the arbitration clauses have to 
be signed must have verified the actual intent of the parties and the 
clause can’t be signed before the expiration of any probationary 
period or, if none, at least 30 days after the beginning of the 
employment contract; and  
3) disputes relating to dismissal cannot be subject to arbitration 
clauses. 
In contrast to the American system, even this limited Italian 
exception for contractual arbitration agreements seems designed to 
protect vulnerable employees and insure that arbitration agreements are 
                                                                                                                                         
AnimalFeeds,  559 U.S. 662; American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.C. 2304 
and 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247. 
133 Non-ritual arbitration need not provide precisely the same procedures as the courts, and 
there is more flexibility in applying the law.  Comparatively, this is similar to arbitration of 
legal claims in the U.S.  
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truly voluntary.  Only labor unions, with more power than individual 
employees, can enter into such agreements. Moreover, arbitration on 
claims relating to dismissal is not allowed, thereby preventing employees 
from sacrificing or limiting their most important legal protections.  In the 
American system, unions can waive employee rights to litigate also, 
including legal claims relating to termination, but the most vulnerable 
employees are those without unions and they have no protections from 
compelled arbitration. 
  Despite the limited acceptance of arbitration enacted in 
2010, the Italian labor market reform of 2012 does not contain any 
reference to arbitration, showing a disregard for this institution.  The brief 
experience of the 2012 Reform confirmed the existence of an extreme 
resistance in Italy towards forms of private jurisdiction, resulting from a 
“statist culture” grown mainly by the CGIL (left-leaning trade union) and 
the expectation created by judges convinced that they must protect 
employees.134 
What most distinguishes employment arbitration in the United 
States from arbitration in Italy is the ability of U.S. employers not only to 
require the worker to agree to arbitration, but also to condition 
employment on the signing of clauses that limit rights provided by law, 
such as caps on damages, reduction of limitation periods, or limits on 
available discovery.  These clauses would be absolutely void in the Italian 
legal system and might also constitute the crime of extortion, as defined 
by art. 629 of the Penal Code: "Whoever, by violence or threats, forcing 
another person to do or omit anything, procures for himself or others an 
unjust profit and a detriment of others shall be punished with 
imprisonment between one and five years."135 
The problem of arbitration clauses that limit class actions, which 
carries great importance in the United States, is entirely absent from 
Italian labor law.  In Italy, the class action, which was introduced in 2007 
by Act 244, is available to consumers or users who suffer damages from 
signing form contracts, pursuant to Article 1342 of the Civil Code, or as a 
result of non-contractual torts, unfair trade practices or anti-competitive 
trade behavior.  It does not apply to the employment contract. 
                                                     
134 See L. ZOPPOLI, Certificazione dei contratti di lavoro e arbitrato: le liaisons dangereuses, 
Working Paper C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” – IT, 2010, n. 102; P. ALLEVA, G. NACCARI, 
Legge “Sacconi”: un fascio di incostituzionalità, in il Manifesto, 25 marzo 2010; M. 
ROCCELLA, Lo squilibrio legalizzato tra imprese e lavoratori, in il Manifesto, 21 ottobre 
2010; F. SCARPELLI, Giurisdizione, tutela dei diritti, arbitrato: l’ossessione del legislatore di 
centrodestra, Note informative, 2010, 47. 
135 A recent decision by the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione Penale, Sez. VI 1 luglio 
2010, n. 32252) found an employer who required an employee to provide a pre-signed 
letter of resignation as a condition of hiring guilty of extortion. 
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In addition, Article 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1942, 
provides: "more parties can act or be sued in the same process, when a 
connection exists between the causes that are presented in terms of the 
object or the title on which they depend, or when the decision depends 
partially or entirely, on the resolution of the same issues".  Based on this 
rule, there are cases in which a large number of petitions are filed in a 
single case. With one judicial claim, a number of employees of the same 
employer may bring a variety of individual petitions, when the connection 
described above exists.  A not uncommon example is collective 
redundancies caused by the employer’s organization, while a public sector 
example is legal actions alleging violation of the rules on recruitment 
examinations brought by the excluded candidates. But this is not a class 
action and the procedure is identical to the ordinary procedure, be it one 
actor, five or one hundred. 
B. Learning From One Another  
From an Italian perspective, it is difficult to answer the question of 
what the Italian system could draw from the U.S. experience.  The 
resolution of employment disputes in the United States offers a variety of 
methods that appear to respond mainly to practical needs.  In the U.S., 
the authoritativeness of arbitration does not seem to be called into 
question.  This result has been accomplished primarily by the courts.  In 
contrast to Italy, the legislation relating to arbitration has not changed. 
This does not imply, however, that workers and their lawyers do not 
challenge individual arbitration agreements imposed when the worker is 
in a state of maximum weakness, that is, at the time of hiring. 
In the Italian civil law system, judges play a key role in turning 
the “law in the books” into “law in action”, with long and “creative” 
explanations of the judgments. Paradoxically, excessive and lengthy 
reasoning that explains the judgment has turned the judge from being 
the mouth of the law to the subject who gives voice to the law, and 
becomes master of the meaning of the rule of law. 
The more interpretation defines the meaning of the rules, the 
more crucial the role of the judge in identifying the authentic content of 
the right in accordance with the rules defined by the case law.  If one 
adds to this the general perception - experienced especially since the 
1970s - that the Italian courts in labor cases are biased in favor of the 
employees, since they are considered the weaker party to the 
relationship, it is easy to understand why in Italy, where the employee 
has the right to refuse arbitration, the use of arbitration is limited: 
usually employees bring claims in Labor Court because they think they 
can count on a judge who favors them.  
For this reason arbitration in Italy is used primarily in cases of 
high asset value, occurring in legal relationships characterized by 
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significant economic exchanges, with a notable lack of confidence in 
ordinary justice, deemed incapable of deciding the interests at stake, 
both for cultural inadequacy and excessive bureaucracy.  
The judge’s role is crucial in American law as well, but that power 
has been exercised to interpret the law to force employees into 
arbitration.  The U.S. could learn from the Italian system a measure 
caution regarding protection of employee rights.  While the American 
courts are not considered pro-employee, the American jury system 
provides a counterweight to the relatively pro-employer orientation of 
many courts.  Conventional wisdom is that employees fare better in front 
of juries because jurors relate to the “little guy” suing the big employer.  
Studies show that employees in the U.S. generally fare better in court 
than in arbitration on statutory claims such as discrimination, and, in 
addition, many cases settle favorably to the employee before trial.136  
Jurors also tend to award more damages to employees than arbitrators in 
these cases.137  Thus, it would seem that given an informed choice, many 
U.S. employees, like Italian employees, would choose to go to court 
rather than arbitrate claims based on employment statutes.   
Even in the Italian system, however, arbitration is utilized in cases 
involving high asset value.  Interestingly, the data on the American 
system shows that higher paid employees fare better in arbitration on 
their employment contract claims.138  These employees are sufficiently 
powerful to compel an employer to negotiate an employment contract 
and thus, also likely to be able to hire an experienced lawyer to arbitrate 
their claim.  For these employees, as in Italy, a choice of arbitration may 
be rational.  For most other U.S. employees, however, employment 
arbitration is not a choice and may require giving up statutory rights with 
a reduced chance of prevailing on any claim.  On the other side of the 
equation, however, is the fact that many U.S. employees cannot find 
legal representation for either litigation or arbitration.139  This fact has 
convinced some commentators to advocate an arbitral forum that is 
easier for employees to navigate without legal representation.140 
Taking into account the Italian concern for employees’ rights, the 
U.S. might modify the employment arbitration system. There are several 
possible options.  Like Italy, arbitration could be a choice for both parties 
to each dispute.  Alternatively, U.S. law could make the contractual 
choice for employment arbitration truly optional, refusing to enforce 
agreements imposed as a condition of employment. This might be 
                                                     
136 Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 67, at 378-90.  As noted by Mahony & Wheeler, however, 
caution must be used in assessing the studies, because all have limitations.  Id. 
137 Id. at 384-85. 
138 Id. at 379, 384. 
139 Id. at 382. 
140 St. Antoine, supra note 65, at 91- 93.   
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accompanied by a requirement that the employer provide information to 
enable employees to make an informed choice, such as details about the 
system of arbitration and what the employee loses by foregoing litigation 
for arbitration or vice versa.  Another possibility would be for the 
government to provide information to enable employees to make an 
informed choice about arbitration.141  A final option would be to impose 
express and consistent legal standards on any arbitration system adopted 
by employers to insure that the system is not unduly favorable to the 
employer.  Any of these options could be instituted by legislation.  
Because of the current interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
however, legislation would have to be enacted at the federal level. 
Given the infatuation of the U.S. courts with arbitration, the latter 
might be the most palatable option.  Many arbitration providers already 
have standards, although they are not legally enforceable.142  And 
employers remain free to choose a provider with standards favorable to 
the employer.  Additionally, as no, courts have imposed some standards 
under the Federal Arbitration Act.143  Existing standards vary by court, 
however, and their very unpredictability leads to litigation. Mandatory 
standards imposed by legislation would insure some level of protection of 
employee rights while still providing the alternative forum that the courts 
desire.  Such a result is unlikely, however, without a more active and 
effective lobbying effort by advocates of employees and consumers. 
V. Conclusion 
The Italian and American arbitration systems have evolved in the 
context of the very different legal systems and cultures in the two 
countries.  As a result, it seems unlikely that the Italian system will draw 
from the American system.  Despite laws authorizing arbitration that is 
less tethered to the law, the strong belief that the judicial system is the 
best protector of employee rights limits its use except in cases of high-
level employees.  The U.S. could learn from the Italian system a 
heightened sensitivity to the protection of employee rights.  If arbitration 
is to be used in for individual employees, legislative protection that 
insures that they are not deprived existing legal protections would 
provide a more balanced system of dispute resolution. Given the current 
power of business interests and the weakness of workers, however, this 
changes seems unlikely. 
                                                     
141 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index:  Using a Public Rating 
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of 
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012) (proposing a rating 
system). 
142 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL 
FORUM 271, 290-91 (advocating implementation of reform by arbitration providers in 
consumer arbitration). 
143 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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